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- Chapter Ten : Imperial and External Relations By Alexander Brady [
] Laurier
did not wish to be consulted on British policy in Europe, because the consultation,
never satisfactory in itself, would commit Canada in the future. He was in agreement
with Asquith, who in the same Conference had remarked that authority in foreign
policy could not be shared. It must rest with the British Government. If that
Government made a decision which resulted in war, ipso facto Canada was
at war. But she was absolutely free to decide what part if any she should take
in the actual hostilities. The position may have seemed illogical, but the motive
behind it has substantially continued to influence Canadian policy in intra-imperial
matters to the present day. Canada as a North American community had special interests
requiring the first consideration of her statesmen. The protection of these interests
depended on a policy of limited liability, and to this policy Laurier ever subscribed.
In the debate on the Naval Service Bill of 1910 he had remarked: " I do not
pretend to be an imperialist. Neither do I pretend to be an anti-imperialist.
I am a Canadian first, last and all the time." This confession could as readily
have been made by any subsequent Canadian leader. Sir Robert Borden on accession
to office was expected to reverse the policy of his predecesssor, and in agreeing
to closer consultation with the British Government he partially did so. But throughout
his premiership as a whole he was no less a nationalist than Laurier, and voiced
with equal emphasis a policy of limited liability. Illustrative of the fact is
his insertion in the abortive Anglo-Franco-American security treaty of 1919 a
clause authorizing any dominion to exempt itself from the alliance, and hence
from a war in which the other parties might be involved. In truth, Borden like
Laurier merely upheld a national creed to which most Canadian leaders have subscribed. In
the endeavour to establish a Dominion navy, rather than give contributions of
money to the imperial treasury, Laurier pursued a policy in harmony with his stand
on other questions at the Conferences. He was convinced that national feeling
would not tolerate the contribution of money for the British Admiralty to spend.
" Shall Canada," asked the Globe, " hire a substitute to
do her fighting? " From the point of view of imperial defence, Laurier's
policy may have been mistaken. But it was a policy not unreasonable for a nationally
conscious dominion to pursue. It is significant that the political opponents who
criticised him most violently on the particularism of his naval scheme, a few
years later in the crisis of the Great War no less strongly insisted on national
recognition in the organization of the army in France. Sentiment in such matters
is unlikely to be the monopoly of any one party. Surveying
broadly the development of Canadian policy in imperial and external affairs previous
to 1914, the two facts which stand out most saliently are, the considerable freedom
attained in the negotiation of commercial treaties and the consistent opposition
to closer imperial organization. The development in the treaty power was understandable,
since, as already pointed out, it was merely the necessary completion of self-government.
But students of empire in Great Britain found more difficulty in understanding
Canada's particularism - her unwillingness to assist in the tightening of imperial
ties. Yet there is no mystery concerning it. Its explanation is mainly found in
the jealousy of the self-governing spirit and the vitality of national sentiment,
ever growing stronger with the exercise of political freedom. Canada was after
all an empire in itself. The responsibility of developing vast territories and
binding them together with railways challenged all the resources of the Federal
Government, and it shrank from assuming the additional burdens of defence and
foreign policy. It looked with suspicion upon any imperial centralization because
such centralization might imply an encroachment upon the self-government so essential
for internal development. A further factor of importance is the duality of the
Canadian nation. While the English-speaking population may cherish with lively
sentiment the Empire, the French Canadians look upon it in a more calculating
temper. La Presse, during the South African war, stated an abiding reality,
too often forgotten both in Canada and Great Britain: " We French-Canadians
belong to one country, Canada; but the English-Canadians have two countries, one
here and one across the sea". No policy of a Federal Government can be permanently
successful which does not rest on the compounded sentiment of the two peoples,
and that sentiment will never be exuberant in its imperialism. Rarely has it been
better expressed than in the policy of Laurier, who adopted a middle ground satisfactory
to reasonable men of both racial groups. The
Great War brought far-reaching changes in the external relations of Canada, largely
because it brought a change in Canadians themselves. When the British Government
declared war, Canada with the partial exception of Quebec unhesitatingly assumed
with vigour the responsibilities of a belligerent. It has been said with some
truth that the Second Battle of Ypres made the Canadians a new people. This and
other events in which the Canadian troops won distinction created community pride,
the mother of national sentiment. It made Canadians feel as never before that
they deserved a place among the nations, and on the conclusion of the struggle
the feeling found concrete expression. A community that buried 50,000 sons on
the battlefields of France and Flanders had claims to make, especially a claim
to that national status under the British Crown which Macdonald and Laurier had
pictured as her destiny. The formal recognition of this status came with the Peace
Settlement. But before that event Canada and the other Dominions had come to share
a more active participation than before in the higher foreign policy. This was
secured through representation on the Imperial War Cabinet, where their representatives
met British ministers on a basis of virtual equality. Out of the Imperial War
Cabinet the Peace Delegation of the Empire was recruited. But most important among
the events of 1918 was Sir Robert Borden's vigorous contention that Canada required
representation in the negotiations of peace separate from that of the British
Empire Delegation. She could not be content with " a status inferior to that
accorded to nations less advanced in development, less amply endowed with wealth,
resources and population, no more complete in sovereignty and far less conspicuous
in their sacrifice ". Hence the
arrangement whereby the chief Dominions had distinct delegations on a footing
similar to such small states as Belgium, while at the same time their representatives
constituted a part of the British Empire Delegation. The treaties were separately
ratified for Canada by the Crown on approval by the Canadian Parliament. In virtue
of her independent signature, the Dominion became a member of the League of Nations,
where her representatives might act, and have acted, independently of those representing
the Empire. Canada insisted on this recognition under the national sentiment aroused
by the War. [
] Source: Alexander
Brady, Canada, London, Ernest Benn Limited, 1932, 374p., pp. 327-331 ©
2000 Claude Bélanger, Marianopolis College |